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Abstract The centralised discourse claiming ownership of ‘knowledge’ and
‘higher education’ seems to be declining as the decentralising discourse extolling
open source software and informal social network communication are emerging: yet
the two are complementary when higher education is seen as a commodity. Thus, in
the internet age of the twenty first century there is no consistent narrative to identify
what a ‘higher education’ consists of. J. F. Lyotard famously predicted in The Post
Modern Condition that the commercialised computer age would ‘sound the knell’ of
the professor. Lyotard understood that in order to begin to philosophise about higher
education in an era of computerisation, the gatekeeper of knowledge role tradi-
tionally attributed to professors through a university title must first be rendered
illegitimate. Lyotard did not envision, however, what a higher education might look
like within the network neutral internet space, where the difference between
‘higher’ and ‘public’ education can be reduced through open accessibility to, and
shared construction of, knowledge. Embracing a Socratic model of public discourse
that openly challenges an epistemology of consensus, network neutrality has the
potential to redefine the role of professors as fiduciaries of education across society,
even globally. The resulting academic equality between professors and the public
recreates the university as a boundless meeting space for public dialogue, and the
professor as a digitized public intellectual.
Keywords Performance  Commodification  Democratic practices  Lyotard 
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Narratives controlled by state and corporate funders, particularly those advocating
‘STEM’1 disciplines, define ‘knowledge’ and simultaneously ‘higher education’
scientifically. Their method of determination is economic deliberation and
consensus: expenditure on higher education (HE) unrelated to university compet-
itive advantage is wastage. Contrary to this discourse of centralised authority,
construction and ownership of ‘knowledge’ and ‘higher education’ in modernised
societies seems to promote a decentralising discourse with the emergence of search
engines, open source software and social network media as widely accessible
vehicles of transparent communication. Both directions of higher education give
credence to Lyotard’s (1984) prediction in the Postmodern Condition (hereafter
cited by page only) of the computer age ‘sounding the knell’ of the professor (53).
Lyotard argues that instead of providing the ‘higher education’ conceptualised in the
old ‘grand narratives’ of emancipation and/or speculation (forwarded by Napoleon
and Humboldt, respectively, 48–51), the university professor in the age of
‘incredulity’ is evermore subject to the single criterion of ‘performance’—measured
by market metrics and mediated by the forces controlling the ‘inputs and outputs’ of
HE (29–32). Within this narrative, Lyotard saw ‘experimentation in discourse,
institutions, and values’ (50) becoming devolved upon ‘extrauniversity networks’
rather than the university, with the university functioning to reproduce ‘professional
and technical elite’ and tending to the mass of the ‘addressees of knowledge.’
Indeed, the possibility of open access to organised course material through new
technologies such as MOOC’s (massive open online courses) seem to challenge the
commoditisation of HE by distributing the construction, legitimation and location of
knowledge away from the ‘professor’ towards network users and contributors.
Nevertheless, the extremes of commoditisation and democratisation seem to
complement one another rather than be at odds. Lyotard’s reduction of these
complementary extremes into narratives shows that they are insufficient to define a
‘higher education.’ Yet Lyotard did not envision what a higher education might look
like within the network neutral internet space. Returning to the Socratic model of
public discourse and invalidating the ‘gatekeeper of knowledge’ role attributed to
professors within hierarchical institutions, network neutrality has the potential to
reimagine the role of professors as fiduciaries of education across society, even
globally. The resulting academic equality between professors and the public
recreates the university as a physical and virtual meeting space for public dialogue:
and the professor as a digitized public intellectual.
The Inclusivity/Exclusivity Paradox of Network Neutrality
Without language streamlined through online networks, where is the twenty first
century self? Lyotard suggests that the weak concept of self exists only in a ‘fabric
of relations’ which are ever more complex and mobile (15). Within this fabric, ‘the
1 STEM—science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
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[dominant] system can and must encourage [transfer of knowledge] to the extent
that it combats its own entropy; the novelty of an unexpected ‘‘move,’’ with its
correlative displacement of a partner or group of partners, can supply the [dominant]
system with that increased performativity it forever demands and consumes’ (15).
This seems to philosophically identify how the internet functions within a market-
capitalist system. For example, the principle of ‘network neutrality,’ aimed at
‘preventing restrictions on content, sites, platforms, types of equipment that may be
attached, and modes of communication over the internet’ (Google 2010) is central to
the current ‘move’ towards free search engines, social networks, and open source
software. Google, whose business model relies on network neutrality, has become
so well-known that it is the newest verb, meaning ‘to search for something on the
internet.’ Even academic publishing giant Taylor & Francis now recommend that
authors use GoogleScholar-friendly SEO (Search Engine Optimisation) key words
as this open access search engine has become the primary search tool across the
academic landscape.
The liberalisation of training through the internet has allowed millions of
individuals, normally unable to attend a formal university programme, free access to
cutting-edge theory and interactive training without a profession of faith in the
authorities of that knowledge. Major collaborative initiatives are appearing without
charge to global audiences via the internet, including classes delivered by professors
at top-ranking universities. For example, one US university consortium now offers
almost 40 semester-long ‘MOOCs’ or ‘massive open online courses’ with the slogan
‘Education for Everyone’. And self-managing courses are offered without charge
via computerised learning models, such as the ‘Open Learning Initiative’ sponsored
by one Pennsylvania university. These latter types of courses, however, arguably
lose the dialogic element between teacher-student (Wegerif 2007) and cannot be
creditworthy without ‘qualified’ judgment on the other end, i.e., a ‘professor’ to
evaluate student-developed content.
This borderless distribution of knowledge via MOOCs is a ‘move’ by institutions
only possible because of network neutrality and the abrogation of institutional
borders through dialogue between professors and the public. The contributing
institution benefits from course-building information gathered from participants in
open source courses, and applications such as wikis, websites and open source
software are often developed by users themselves (Downes 2011). Thus the paradox
of needing to de-institutionalise (inclusivity) in order to maintain institutional
legitimacy (exclusivity): a paradox which arises due to the institution needing to
combat entropy by incorporating mass data from open access users to inform their
own exclusive degree programs. As a result, knowledge is ‘produced’ exclusively
by professors and electronically delivered by institutions to unlimited global
‘knowledge consumers’ who then inadvertently feed knowledge-enhancing data
back to the institution, which then legitimises its existence as a public good whilst
enhancing its exclusive provision. Despite the inherent difficulties of culture,
language, intelligence and content selectivity which make ‘Western’ ‘education for
everyone’ a category error (DeVidts 2012), what has been termed ‘crowd-sourcing’
in marketing is fast becoming the new political, as well as educational, norm.
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Although network neutrality is an institutionally-derived ‘move’ towards
enhanced market performativity, and Google seems to be monopolising the internet
landscape, paradoxically network neutrality allows for at least two HE innovations
that challenge the legitimation of institutional ownership of knowledge through the
professor: (1) uncontrolled contribution of global internet users to knowledge
production, and (2) proliferation of public access to learning materials offered by
intellectuals and university consortiums. Without a universal or what Lyotard terms
a ‘totalising’ narrative to support its self-ordained legitimacy, positional disruption
of the professor might result in influence far beyond the walls of [his]2 institution or
peer-reviewed journal. Of course knowledge, and its predecessor epistemology, are
never ‘neutral’; but perhaps open access to fully-developed course materials via
MOOCs and open access journals are geared, as Lyotard puts it, towards ‘combating
the entropy’ of a self-legitimising knowledge hierarchy traditionally called ‘higher
education.’ Even so, could market monopolies allow entropy to occur to further
public dialogue? Probably not, as democratic values (inclusivity) and market
performance (exclusivity) seem to have competing rationalities.
Performance Rationality and the Paradox of the Open Access Course
Now we shall turn to explore how Lyotard imagines that the deification of a
technical rationality combined with market efficiency construes even autonomous,
publicly-focused ‘professors’ as ‘theory and knowledge producers’; a doomsday
scenario where the professor is replaceable through philosophically reconfiguring
HE provision into an efficient data collection and transfer system, legitimised by
sophisticated measuring instruments. From the outset: narratives of performance
rely on deliverables; it is impossible to ‘deliver’ a higher education; therefore the
assumption that open access courses delivered to the public can comprise a higher
education is propositionally false.
Lyotard defines ‘performativity’ as the goal of a systemtheorie, i.e., optimisation
of the global relationship between input and output. Optimal monetised production
outputs are a central feature, with dysfunctions seen merely as ‘internal readjust-
ments’. The only alternative to this kind of performance improvement is ‘entropy’,
or decline (11). Visualise learning circulating along the same lines as money,
Lyotard asks. The pertinent distinction would no longer be between ‘knowledge’
and ‘ignorance’, but rather, in verisimilitude with money, between ‘payment
knowledge’—units of knowledge exchanged in a daily maintenance framework (for
survival purposes) versus ‘knowledge funds’ dedicated to optimizing the
2 [He/his] in brackets is a purposeful and relevant challenge to the gender neutral term ‘professor’. In
English the neutralized ‘his or her’ disregards the historical record. Even though nowadays there are many
female professors, the concept of professor originated in a male-only university environment, and males
still hold the vast majority of these titles. The title itself should be critiqued from a gender perspective
(see Nuyen 1995), and in my opinion, including the generic ‘his or her’ or changing to a generic ‘her’ or
leaving out the brackets to the generic ‘his’ disregards the centuries-long struggle for women to even be
considered for formal education, much less the title ‘professor’; so I leave the brackets, highlighting the




performance of a project. In this conception, computerised means which ‘optimise’
predictable ends would delegitimise professors as agents of education and
consequently invalidate the imaginary ‘social contract’ which legitimises ‘the
market’ as a space for education, as its system requirement of quantifiable
performances would inject optimisation through dialogic entropy.
However, the ‘professor’ is hardly a computer-enhanced function of self-
legitimation governed and commoditised by financially strong and globally-
influential university partners or brands in ‘post-industrial’ market societies.
Notwithstanding, Lyotard identifies a more technical rationality at work in the
production narrative: ‘since performativity increases the ability to produce proof, it
also increases the ability to be right’ so ‘scientists, technicians, and instruments are
purchased not to find truth, but to augment power’ through a single ‘technical
criterion’ of performance (46) which assumes the technical instrument is more
accurate than the human senses, as can be recognised by computerised valuations of
universities on ranking scales based on ‘quantity of X’ where X is defined by those
holding the measuring tape as a superior performance item.
One of the emergent examples of Lyotard’s technical performance rationality can
be seen in the concept of ‘MOOCs’ or ‘Massive Open Online Courses’ which are
offered gratis online and can be accessed by anyone with high speed internet. These
courses have been available for over a decade through certain institutions and
private philanthropic initiatives, but now that ‘top-ranked’ universities have taken
them on and seemingly opened up their curriculum to the internet public, these
courses suddenly are able to provide a conceivably-viable alternative to traditional
on-campus or faculty-developed curriculum delivery and assessment: to the extent
that Steve Kolowich reported in a May 2nd, 2013 Chronicle of Higher Education
web article entitled Why professors at San Jose State won’t use a Harvard
professor’s MOOC that philosophy professors at one university are fighting the
administration over a decision to offer a MOOC from another as a credit-bearing
alternative to their curriculum. The administration defends its position with recent
experimental evidence that enrolled students who took a MOOC in electrical
engineering scored higher on their exams than a traditional course. The computer-
controlled MOOC is thus legitimised by a single example of technical performance
uncritically generalised across disciplines.
And immediately delegitimised through its own legitimation. There is an
underlying educational assumption that the ‘brand name’ prestigious university on
the top of the rankings who produce and deliver the MOOC has superior pedagogy
to the ‘lesser ranked’ universities taking on their MOOCs. This assumption is of
course legitimised solely on the consensus of university administrators or
technocrats who in many cases outnumber tenured faculty. But do not the results
of the electrical engineering experiment ‘prove’ that university students are better
off with a MOOC than a philosophy professor? Actually, assuming that electrical
engineering, an applied science, correlates with the humanities only reveals a
categorical fallacy in conceptualising education across domains. The performance
criteria of memorising basic electrical engineering content and solving straightfor-
ward theoretical problems can only be transposed to conceptualising philosophical
arguments in creative and individual ways through a technical rationality imposed
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on the definition of higher education. The categorically false assumption is revealed
by Leibniz’s Law: one set of exam performances (electrical engineering) can only
be replicated to a different set of exams (philosophy) if both exams consist of
identical elements, which is obviously not the case (to take this challenge into the
modern assessment literature, readers are directed to the criteria of construct validity
in Messick 1995). But perhaps the strongest critique of the MOOC experiment is
that the administration has determined that ‘delivery’ of an acceptable score on an
online exam performance equates to a higher education.
According to Lyotard, when market rationality defines the human as material
subject, self-legitimised hierarchy aims to control ‘human capital’ through
deterministic systems, and only those functions which support this system are
acceptable. Under this techno-bureaucratic societal framing, graduates trained in
theoretical narratives are unemployable. In response, funds allocated to programmes
that produce unemployable graduates are removed; alternatively, study programmes
are cancelled due to lack of applications, or entire faculties sacrificed for a greater
business vision such as rankings prestige (Nuyen 1992; Bok 2003), or in the MOOC
case above, the cost of a salaried professor. Lyotard suggests that with the continued
materialisation of knowledge found in theories such as Marxism and Capitalism
(Peters 2007), training in theoretical beliefs will cease, despite their desirability as
topics of inquiry; and professors will be made redundant as they are unnecessary for
the delivery of skills training. Consequently, the invisible hand of hegemony
reduces the professor from autonomous public educator to a cog, a manager, in
principle replaceable by management software.
Two clear examples of how Lyotard’s ‘input and output’ performativity
narratives delegitimise professors are through ‘word count’ and ‘scheduled
supervision’ policies controlled by arbitrary software surveillance. Word processing
software calculates each word/character/symbol with such precision that a writer
can always see a calculating icon on the screen. Arbitrary and oftentimes confusing
limitations of ‘word volume’ are justified through an efficiency principle confining
both students and professors to policy that someone ‘out there’ determined. Students
must ‘in X number of words, evaluate’ something that took the (oftentimes concise)
original writers several volumes to consider. Consequently, the X word essay as the
default mode of student performance evaluation controls the depth of inquiry on any
given subject through arbitrarily restricting the amount of coherent thought that can
be communicated by the student and simultaneously assumes negative conse-
quences for non-compliance. Professors, on the other hand, oftentimes elaborate
insufficiently and incoherently (Feak 2009) on a student or peer’s work without
penalty. Likewise, professors’ time is clocked in the name of ‘accountability’
through computerised surveillance applications which arbitrarily schedule and count
doctoral supervision for each professor and candidate, systematically sending ‘email
reminders’ of fictional appointments. I have received two such fictional appoint-
ments recently and a subsequent email from the interlocutor saying ‘disregard.’
Paradoxically, the socio-political ‘free market’ discourse could claim these
computerised controls as democratic progress through invoking references to social
justice: for example, for monitoring ‘equality’ of provision to all students whilst
efficiently monitoring ‘fairness’ through calculating worked hours.
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What is missing, however, is the ability to counter these claims within the all-
encompassing rationality of the narrative. Is progress simultaneously confinement?
In other words, are counted words comparable to meaningful utterances? Are hours
at work comparable to hours worked if your job is a thinker? Knowledge is anything
but ‘internal’ with such ‘externally determined’ borders. The failure of the professor
continuing as the disseminator of knowledge in the internet age is that the
transcendent narrative meant to establish knowledge in the university only reifies
the power of its self-legitimised administration: ‘knowledge and power are simply
two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows
what needs to be decided? In the computer age, the question of knowledge is now
more than ever a question of government’ (8).
The above scenario of HE market reductionism seems to expose the conflicted
direction of higher education in the information age, that serves not only
theoretically but practically to delegitimise the professor. Pull and push forces
moving towards and away from centralisation range from student-developed ‘open
source’ courses and freely accessible material offered by public intellectuals to
visions of ‘assembly line’ HE models controlled by computerised administration.
Sometimes there is little distinction between the two. Both open-source and
privatized interests construct a discourse of the ‘delivery’ of an electronic ‘product’
within an ‘institution’ of higher education. This discourse only reifies higher
education as a closed, deterministic system: a logical impossibility if higher is
defined as going above.
The Higher Education Paradox of Flipped Classrooms and Digital Taylorism
Video lectures with high quality sound, pause, replay, and download capability are
already an inescapable mode of knowledge transfer in institutionally-determined
HE. For example, Prober and Heath (2012) cite many experiments from their
university in California, such as a Computer Science course broken down into
10–15 min video segments with constant online quizzes and several Medicine
lectures transformed into short online video presentations prior to the classroom
activities. The authors suggest that these approaches have increased student
satisfaction and engagement. They promote a ‘radical’ shift away from the lecture:
‘in an era with a perfect video-delivery platform…why would anyone waste
precious class time on a lecture?’ into a ‘flipped-classroom model’, where ‘students
absorb an instructor’s lecture as homework in a digital format, freeing up class time
for a focus on applications. By recognising the viability of new digital media to
replace the lecturer as knowledge transmitter, however, what Prober and Heath
promote is more than online self-calculating quizzes or video lessons: philosoph-
ically they admit their own delegitimation as lecturers.
Gombrich (2011) takes the delegitimation of the lecturer to its logical conclusion
on his dual Ba/BSc programme in London based on what can be described as a
‘crowd-sourcing’ model of higher education: ‘lectures as a way of delivering
content are over’. His model requires that each fee-paying student submit three
questions to the lecturer based a lecture recorded in advance and placed on a Virtual
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Learning Environment (VLE). The lecturer then collates all the questions and
chooses the most frequent 10–30 questions to address. Gombrich suggests that this
can be student-led and accomplished almost instantly through the VLE. The 1 h slot
that had been used for the lecture is now a full class discussion, ‘with the lecturer
leading and discussing all the issues the class wanted to discuss’. Essentially,
students would have 2 or 3 h of weekly forum discussions with ‘leading academics’
based on questions that interest students.
Gombrich suggests that his model could easily accommodate 180 students per
lecturer. In classes that large, this democratic-institutional model could only situate
knowledge into the quantified ‘interests’ of the students through frequency, rather
than the disciplined expertise of the professor—the one individual who could
potentially sort the questions in a meaningful way, such as that one in the bottom of
the pile which might lead to an alternate way of understanding the material. When
applying the market efficiency principle, one can see the discussion leader function
completed online through a social network, simply due to the practicalities of such
large forums. The greatest threat to this model is perhaps not the surrogacy of the
professor to the student, however, but customer majority rule. If customer majority
rule leveraged control of the internet, thus ‘owning’ this dissemination of
knowledge, intellectuals would lose their public value and return to their professor
high chairs where they offer the exact same videotaped courses as a ‘payment for
knowledge’ exchange: in other words, a return to their insular institutional norms
and private knowledge communities at the expense of democratic knowledge
exchange with the public. To cite John Stuart Mill (1859, 18) from On Liberty: ‘If
all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind.’
A more extreme position towards commoditisation of higher education in the
information age, commonly called ‘new’ or ‘digital’ Taylorism3 (Au 2011; Parenti
2001) can be observed through the below extended quote, excerpted from a blog
titled ‘The economic advantage of online education’ posted on the Huffington Post,
16 February 2012 by the dean of a prominent US faculty, outlining an ‘assembly
line in higher education’:
Instead of one professor creating and delivering a course; we see the following
lineup of education workers: A) course designers, B) content developers, C)
course facilitators, and possibly, D) tutors and graders. The course designer,
Worker A, is an instructional technologist, perhaps with a master’s degree in
education, expert in learning objectives and assessment of learning. The
content developer, Worker B, is the scholar in the field who will populate the
course website with readings, notes, taped lectures or speeches, assignments,
etc. The course facilitator, Worker C, is the instructor or mentor, who interacts
with students and guides their learning. Tutors (Worker D, or an outsourced
service) can be utilized for learners with more than average learning
3 Under Taylorism, the role of the manager is to break down tasks and give specific instructions to
workers, and must have the right tools in order to do their job. In turn, workers only role is to do exactly
as they are told and fill whatever quota they are given.
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challenges; eliminating the need for office hours. And finally, in what can be
described as icing on the cake for faculty considering whether to go online, the
graders (Worker D, again) are called into objectively evaluate student
submitted work, using rubrics provided by the course designer and content
developer. Theoretically, this lowers the cost of higher education by reducing
the number of hours required of the scholar in the education process, and
replacing that scholar with professionals who specialize in the various other
activities; and who are normally lower paid than a chaired professor in
finance. Moreover, it frees up the scholar to focus on the research, which
justifies that high salary.
Professor Gilbert then compares the cost savings of her proposed model with the
‘traditional model’ suggesting massive financial savings if more than 40 enrol, and
closes with: ‘in asking yourself whether online learning and the production model
described here will catch on, I think the answer is obvious. And, If history repeats
itself, and if the lessons of economics are to be believed, the U.S. will be better
educated at more affordable tuition rates, and scholarship will not suffer in the
least…’
Why stop at the death of the lecturer? Since the aim is to use ‘cost-efficient’,
easily accessible video technology to engage students-as-customers, the videos
could be made by paid actors offering charisma and clear pronunciation; and the
classroom activities could be delivered by external professionals or consultants
actually working in the field. These external contributors could even consult via a
free social network on their mobile phones: new ‘cloud computing’ platforms and
‘digital archives’, for example, enable users to access information anywhere, in any
quantity, delegitimising the professor and the university library as the site-specific
gatekeepers of accepted scientific knowledge. Passwords protected by the university
are unnecessary for information transfer in the cloud, as the content could be
contributed from a different source than the university yet potentially produce the
same or better exam results for the student entirely absent a professor.
As research-intensive universities embrace a corporate governance and mana-
gerial model (Gibbs, Knapper & Piccinin, 2009), tasks can be expected to be
singularised, and expensive professors that teach other than job-ready competences
(i.e., broad theoretical knowledge) made expendable through efficiency narratives
(Peters 2007). To illustrate, a quasi-experiment with a large sample of Physics
undergraduates compared two sections of a course, one taught by Nobel-Prize
winner and another taught by teaching assistants. The results showed that the
section taught by assistants produced higher course ratings, attendance, and test
scores: students averaged 74 % as opposed to 41 % (Deslauriers, Schelew &
Wieman 2011). Although these results represent a quite limited study, computerised
administration in this paradigm offers ‘customers’ professor performativity; and if
the professor cannot perform, an assistant making minimum wage will.
Although the efficiency of corporate performativity increases percentages and
dethrones the professor-as-lecturer by distributing accepted scientific knowledge via
video, cloud computing and social networking; or saving human ‘capital’ by
providing ‘Workers ABCD’ in an ‘online learning production model’, reliance on
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information accessibility alone hardly guarantees ‘better educated’ citizens. Who in
the above design provides intellectual stimulation beyond digitalised a posteriori
research data? Who provides what Greeks called ‘aporia’ or puzzlement resulting
from thought-provoking dialogue? Who provides the counterclaim to an ethic of
humans as capital! In other words, financially cost-efficient ‘assembly line’ HE
could theoretically reproduce certificated ‘knowledge workers’ only at the
incalculable expense of the types of dialogue which arguably create an educated
public.
Illegitimate Twins: The Professor and the Public Intellectual
I recently posed the following question conversationally to several undergraduate
students of politics in a Eurasian campus cafe´: ‘Which university was Socrates a
professor at?’ The responses worth mentioning were ‘Greek’ or ‘Athens’ university.
Every student without exception answered positively as if it was certain that
Socrates was a professor. Of course the first university was consecrated in Bologna,
Italy in 1088 (de Ridder-Symoens 1992) by the Catholic Pope more than
1,400 years after Socrates’ death. Furthermore, Socrates was hardly part of
institutional education: he taught anyone on the street who would listen, a prototype
of what is referred to in modern times as the ‘public intellectual’. This general
knowledge is relatively meaningless as a philosophical inquiry; however, as an
educational inquiry several questions emerge about the ‘professor’: why would
students equate ‘Socrates’ with ‘professor’? In what context did the ‘professor’
emerge, and why does the ‘professor’ seem to substitute or accentuate the
philosopher or great thinker? Moreover, is ‘higher education’ symbiotic with the
institutionally-dependent professorship?
Professor: Titled Thinker or Scientific Priest?
The Oxford English Dictionary subjects ‘professor’ to many definitions, some
broadened to its faith-based etymology, ‘A person who makes open declaration of
his or her feelings or beliefs, or of allegiance to some principle’ and others narrowed
to a university title, but all dependent on a relationship between individuals and the
social status of their beliefs. This paper narrows the ‘professor’ to the hierarchical-
institutional sense: ‘A university academic of the highest rank; specifically the
holder of a university chair in a specified faculty or subject’. The professor in this
sense is symbolic of what Lyotard terms a ‘metanarrative’, which Lyotard defines as
‘a totalising discourse of value’—such as religion or science—that relies on a ‘grand
narrative’ or ‘transcendent and universal truth’ (xiv). One clear example is the
scientific case the Enlightenment ideal of reason over mythology: the Enlightenment
discourse of induction and deduction reduces the religious claim of faith-based-
knowledge to absurdity. So, one ‘metanarrative’ trumps another. Lyotard sees the
‘professor’ as a function which legitimises ‘totalising discourses’ such as religions
or science, since metanarratives indeed require spokespersons who speak from some
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sort of legitimate authority. Lyotard assumes that a professor is required by the
calling of [his] vocation to come up with a theory (narrative that supports the
legitimacy of the metanarrative), then to spread these theoretical views to the
students. In turn, students learn what is acceptable as science and knowledge.
However, according to Lyotard’s Post Modern Condition when a theory becomes
unnecessary to support the metanarrative, the legitimising-of-knowledge function of
the professor vanishes (Nuyen 1992).
The complex historical question of the emergence of the titled, legitimised
thinker is well beyond the scope of this essay, but simply stated: Christianity is the
origin of the university and its corollary, the professor. The vast majority of ‘top-
ranking’ universities over 100 years old in Europe or the US were founded by
Christians, and beyond the revealing architecture, Christian rituals still permeate.
For example, according to Anne Lonsdale, former Pro-Vice-Chancellor of
Cambridge University, during an October 2011 face-to-face conversation, gradu-
ating bachelor’s degree students to this day must kneel and receive a blessing from
the Vice-Chancellor in Latin: ‘by the authority committed to me I admit you to the
degree of X in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.’ Of
course the title Pro-Vice-Chancellor in most universities refers to ‘professor’ rather
than ‘priest’, but any ambiguity through the mask of scientific liberalism is unable to
deny the professor functioning as gatekeeper (representative) of some sacred
knowledge (in God’s name), whether that ultimate-authority is the Holy Trinity or
the Scientific Method.
Science and Christianity, then, have a common feature: both can be framed as
institutionalised stories legitimised by those in high chairs. Each story legitimises
existing power relations through appropriating reasons and explanations to the
narrative, which is determined to be ‘universal truth’ (xiv). For example, in
Feuerbach (1843) showed how the Christian narrative was not an explanation but a
legitimation of the norms of Christian society. On the other end of the spectrum,
Nietzsche (1982, 450) philosophised that science is a religious paradox from which
even Nietzsche cannot escape: ‘It always remains a metaphysical faith upon which
our faith in science rests—that even we devotees of knowledge today, we godless
ones and anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire too from the flame which a faith a
thousand years old has kindled: that Christian faith, which was also Plato’s faith,
that God is truth, that truth is divine.’ And in a similar critique of a metaphysics of
the transcendence of science, Lyotard sees science as another language game dating
back to Plato’s cave allegory where ‘knowledge is founded on the narrative of its
own martyrdom’ (28).
More contemporary philosophers, respectively Zˇizˇek and Milband, seemingly
argue from opposing viewpoints on the atheist/theist debate, yet Davis (2009,8)
finds consensus in their deliberation: ‘Reason functions in this atheistic/theistic
debate in a very limited, even reductionist way as it becomes the final arbiter of all
truth forced into propositional form and thus sundered from everyday life’. In
Lyotard’s conception of this problem, however, the metanarrative of Christianity
has been upended by the metanarrative of science, but since ‘scientific knowledge is
a kind of discourse’ (3) the ‘professor’ as a believer and proponent of scientific
knowledge plays a gatekeeper role in the legitimation of accepted ‘truth’ through
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the discourse [he] promulgates: like Plato’s protagonist who escapes and returns,
this is a story [he] must inevitably deny to uphold the universal narrative of
‘knowledge as liberating progress’ obtained solely through [his] tutelage.
Who, then, decides the conditions of truth? According to Lyotard ‘There is no
other proof that the rules are good than the consensus extended to them by the
experts’ (29). Lyotard claims that narrative knowledge, to become legitimate, must
combine at least two criteria: institutional deliberation of what has truth-value, and
formulaic prescriptions that have the status of norms. This ‘consensus’ thinking is in
line with Habermas’s (1984; 1987) conception of ‘communicative action’ which
aims to achieve mutual understandings as a basis to coordinate emancipatory social
action. However, Luhmann (2013, p. 205) conjectures that the ‘speech act’
underlying Habermas’s theory mistakes the ‘mere conveying of a message’ for
communication; whereas in Luhmann’s systems theory the ‘unity of communica-
tion’ requires an understanding recipient. Lyotard problematizes this further by
suggesting that consensus is reached according to the requirements of institutional
deliberation and the methodology to be engaged, i.e., a narrative of a narrative. For
Lyotard, following Wittgenstein, the principle of a ‘universal metalanguage is
replaced by the principle of a plurality of formal and axiomatic systems capable of
arguing the truth of denotative statements’ (44). Lyotard asks: how is it possible to
do away with narrative by using narrative? (xix) and suggests ‘What used to pass as
a paradox in the knowledge of classical and modern science can acquire a new force
of conviction and win the acceptance of the community of experts’ (44). One
glaring example of this reduction of truth into consensus can be seen through the
self-legitimising discourse of a knowledge hierarchy found in so-called ‘world’
rankings.
University rankings are sustained and promulgated by hierarchies of expert
communities, and consensus won at the expense of the individual partners
constituting those communities becomes a cycle of de facto legitimation (47) of the
self-ordained elite at the top of the knowledge hierarchy. Universities rank
themselves competitively according to how many professors at a given institution
are Nobel Prize winners, their grant funding and easily ‘self-plagiarised’ (Robinson
2012) publication quantity (in journals often edited by professor’s friends and
colleagues),4 which legitimises their opinions and teaching methods to prospective
students through the media, who create what marketers call ‘value propositions’ for
these institutional practices through internet searchable computerised ranking
systems based on the same criteria; the self-legitimised practices of these ‘world-
leading’ institutions are then promoted by the institutions and their camp followers,
and delivered to a group of profiled students filtered through computerised
‘aptitude’ testing instruments legitimised by the same top-ranking universities.
Subsequently, powerful corporations and governments employ human resource
management software which identifies ‘key terms’ in re´sume´s such as names of the
most competitive university ‘brands’ or standardised aptitude test scores—despite
the cultural bias invalidating these constructs (Rindermann 2007)—giving arbitrary
control to the computer to filter candidates for positions of decision-making power.
4 Sometimes called an ‘academic tribe’ (cf. Becher & Trowler 2001).
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These computer-filtered candidates, after gaining experience are selected for
influential positions partially because of their easily recognisable ‘qualifications’
from top-ranked universities with high-profile professors. These financially-wealthy
and influential alumni then reinvest into their alma maters, allowing for the purchase
of evermore accurate technology which advances their first claims to original
knowledge. Repeat.
Rise of the Digitized Public Intellectual
Without the professor who seeks truth beyond a consensus of norms, how then can
the hegemony of rankings be challenged? One scenario: without a professor who
educates beyond the knowledge determined by an institutional elite, the rankings-
controlled research institution will remain as the ‘higher’ educational power through
determining and bracketing ‘knowledge’ using the cycle found in the previous
section. This uncontested knowledge will then be delivered down to the online
masses through closed-system methods that test facts (such as automated quizzes)
without really educating the public into the more abstract conceptual knowledge
achieved through negotiating truth with disciplined intellectuals. The result is a so-
called ‘higher’ education delivered to the public by a self-legitimised knowledge
hierarchy that systematically prevents public refutation or challenge to established
norms. My contention is that this quite plausible outcome of public higher education
in the internet age could easily overlook the essential epistemological concept of
‘paralogy’ or ‘dissensus’ (60), defined by Lyotard as an opposition to consensus that
consists in the questioning of assumptions governing established practices and the
emergence of heterogeneous practices.
If higher education is accepted as a product delivered to student customers,
public engagement becomes public relations. The ‘free online course’ becomes a
marketing tool with what venture capitalists call exponential multiplier effects—a
commodity, which serves the financial bottom line much like rankings: by
uncritically amplifying the institutional ‘brand’ in the minds of the public. Lyotard
predicted that knowledge—defined as research and the transmission of acquired
learning–would increasingly tend towards an exchangeable commodity, thus losing
its value as an ‘end in itself’ and becoming the major stake in the worldwide
competition for economic power: ‘along with the hegemony of computers comes a
certain logic, and therefore a certain set of prescriptions determining which
statements are accepted as ‘‘knowledge’’ statements…anything in the constituted
body of knowledge that is not translatable [into computer language] will be
abandoned’ (4). However, even if computers could lead humans towards ‘dissensus’
as a result of an ad infinitum attempt of perfect information searches mediated by
the global internet public, computers could not lead humans into public concern.
Computers are only tools of information transfer—they do not invent culturally-
mediated goals that ‘originate in prescriptive and evaluative statements that the
computer cannot correct in the course of its functioning’ (17). Thus, the ‘free’
dissemination of courses created by professors through open source educational
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technology and ‘delivered’ by top-ranked institutions cannot substitute an education
of speculation and/or emancipation.
These new spheres of computerised education cannot exist as binary functions of
pre-packaged theory ‘given’ down to the public, but they can be new epistemologies
mediated by public intellectuals and serve the educational needs of the public.
Jacoby (2000, 5) describes the ‘public intellectual’ as a writer and/or thinker who
addresses a general and educated audience. Although Jacoby laments the ‘last
intellectuals’ from a bygone era, nowadays there are many intellectuals who freely
share their ideas to the wider public over the internet. Public intellectuals come from
every field of human inquiry, yet are united by the common ethical position,
idealised by radical educationalist Paulo Freire, that any contribution to knowledge
should be freely accessible even to an illiterate audience, and those audiences
should be able to inform the construction of knowledge.
John Michael (2000) suggests that intellectuals like Stephen Hawking, Cornel
West, and others who commit to an active role in public life are the best result of the
Enlightenment project. Michael suggests that although Enlightenment narratives
may be incredulous, the crucial ideas of ‘reason, justice, and equality’ still frame the
political and cultural work of intellectuals today. What differentiates the ‘digitized
public intellectual’ from the ‘professor,’ however, is hardly ‘reason, justice, and
equality’ in a self-legitimising institutional sense; digitized public intellectual faith
can be described as moral faith in the ideal of knowledge distributed over the
network neutral internet, and the intellectual as a fiduciary of digitally-enhanced
borderless education. Thus, the disruptive ‘move’ of network neutrality5 meant to
enhance capitalist institutions through opening markets, mixed with an ethical belief
in free distribution and interpretation of knowledge has resulted in ‘open source’
construction of new knowledge via the internet. In the most progressive political
moves the role of the professor is morphed from ‘education authority’ into ‘digitized
public intellectual.’ This structural equality between teachers and students directly
challenges what Lyotard terms the ‘totalising effects’ of a market discourse
governed by state and private hierarchies.
Conceptually, then, from an ethic of public concern and a network neutral
platform the digitized public intellectual merges two mutually exclusive concepts:
depth of content with ease of understanding. Otherwise a higher education built on
public dialogue is impossible because the professor is inaccessible outside of the
walls of [his] institution. The below principles identify how digitized public
intellectuals can, and are emerging around the world in the network neutral internet
age of higher education.
The digitized public intellectual speaks openly about their ideas, in a way
that the public can understand and interpret for themselves
This dates back to 1517 A.D. when Dr. Martin Luther, a lecturer in Wittgenstein
Germany, challenged the Catholic authorities by including in his 95 theses: (90) ‘To
5 The principle of ‘network neutrality aims at ‘preventing restrictions on content, sites, platforms, types
of equipment that may be attached, and modes of communication over the internet’ (Google 2010).
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repress [the above written] arguments and scruples of the laity by force alone, and
not to resolve them by giving reasons, is to expose the Church and the pope to the
ridicule of their enemies.’ Luther and his contemporaries argued that the Bible
should be written in plain language, and like the digitized public intellectual
assumed two things: (1) the intelligence of the laity, or the public, and (2) the
public’s right to participate in the construction of knowledge through interpretation.
Today, intellectuals like Michael Sandel (ethics) or Richard Dawkins (biology) can
be found openly on the internet engaging with the public on important political
issues—not through rhetoric and spin—but by clear reasoning, logic and an ethical
belief in the value of shared truth in a language that the public can understand and
interpret for themselves. To use Freire’s terminology, the ‘pedagogy of the
oppressed’ can emancipate the oppressed only when the oppressed comprehend the
terms of reference.
The Digitized Public Intellectual Creates an Ever-Widening Public Dialogue
One example is Scott Thornbury, whose ‘A-Z of ELT’ is disseminated globally via
a free blog site to language teaching professionals, who comment on his ideas, then
Thornbury responds to the comments creating dialogic reciprocity and uses ideas
from the commenting field professionals to inform his university classes.
Importantly, some of Thornbury’s posts are generated from students in his classes,
who also receive the posts in their email inbox and oftentimes engage with field
professionals. This reciprocal, open communication channel creates ever-widening
spirals, or spheres of dialogue (depending on how one conceptualises it) that serve
to help the students, the field professionals, and to use Luther’s terminology
above—‘the laity’—to speculate beyond epistemological boundaries.
The Digitized Public Intellectual Reaches an Unlimited Community of Practice
The empirical concept of ‘communities of practice’ is underpinned by the
philosophy that ‘knowing is an act of participation in ‘‘social learning systems’’’
(Wenger 2000), and the internet has opened new boundaries of a higher education
community. In addition to publishing in open-access online journals which often
have the same peer-reviewed rigour as their exclusive counterparts, digitized public
intellectuals find new ways to engage with communities of practice. A J Cann, for
example, in 2012 presented one of his theories at a major conference via distance
through ‘Google Hangout’ with the reason ‘to lessen his carbon footprint’, and then
posted his presentation online to an open access platform, where any internet user
can have a 360 view–even watching the original audience move around at any time
without registering, paying, or subscribing. Slightly different in focus to the A-Z
blog mentioned above, these openly-shared conference presentations target specific
communities, thus offering the most cutting-edge ideas and results of empirical
studies in the discipline in real time without requiring institutional subsidisation of
expensive travel to conferences or subscription to for-profit journals.
Rise of the Digitized Public Intellectual 109
123
The Digitized Public Intellectual Makes Their Most Significant and Original
Material Accessible to Anyone on the Internet
This criterion: controversial, prolific material. David Harvey, for example, offers a
comprehensive set of courses on Marxist thought to the internet public—not just
‘entry level’ ones like many university-controlled MOOC courses. Living out these
ideals of public engagement with intellectual ideas, Harvey and other professors
from nine New York universities gathered on May 1st, 2012 to collaborate with the
‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement and offer a one-day ‘free university’ promoted
through the internet and open to all. Amongst the topics delivered in a language that
the public could understand and creating an ever-widening public dialogue was the
stability of the current economic system, something that affects everyone, ensuring
that those with the smallest voice had the opportunity to engage with the greatest
thinkers and their most significant ideas.
The Digitized Public Intellectual Asks the Public to Create the Research
Questions, Determine the Best Instruments, and Conduct the Research That
Affects Them
This has a relation to the ‘participatory approach’ to educational research, but
with a digital twist. The ‘Extreme Citizen Science’ group led by Muki Haklay is
concerned with citizens becoming scientists. They have already shown concerned
citizen groups how to use GPS technology to calculate noise pollution around
Heathrow airport, and hunter-gatherer groups in Africa how to use mobile GPS
technology to identify, record, and thus protect their diminishing sacred trees
against an onslaught of corporate and government deforestation programmes.
This engagement with the public does not require subscribing to an ‘emanci-
patory’ truth paradigm where the disenfranchised magically receive political
equality; it is simply the drawing in of human collectives to an education beyond
prescribed delivery.
Educationally speaking, the self-legitimising institutional superstructure sus-
tained by an imaginary hierarchy of knowledge—and its spokesperson the
professor—can be found wanting in what Lyotard coined ‘The Postmodern Age’,
or the age of incredulity towards universal narratives of truth. This has coincided
with the rise of the ‘digitized public intellectual,’ who is more than a ‘knowledge
worker’: she or he is a public fiduciary of knowledge and negotiator of truth that
uses the internet as a tool to educate the public through challenging dialogue. No
longer is the monster intellectual behind the protected walls of the elite institutions,
but rather their humanity is revealed through open dialogue on the internet where
the digitized public intellectual learns as much as they teach and their knowledge
grows in proportion to their public contribution. The knowledge produced by the
digitized public intellectual challenges the commodification of epistemology by





The valorisation of net neutral mobile social networks as a remedy to the ‘totalising’
effects of market reification implies that there will be more and more attempts for
higher education to be ‘delivered’ through the norming of open source freeware
uncontrolled by the self-delegitimising hierarchies of higher education that have
existed since the first Catholic university. Paradoxically, through the notion of ‘net
neutrality’ meant to ‘liberalise’ markets thus produce more ‘shareholder value’, the
market metanarrative ensuring the positional significance of the professor has
functionally imploded. [His] replacement is supposedly the redistribution of
knowledge-as-power to any autonomous learners and teachers who can access a
network neutral, high speed internet. Yet this unlimited student body can educate
themselves only to the limits of the institutional narrative. A higher education of the
internet age must therefore include the ‘digitized public intellectual’ as catalyst of
change. This identifiable intellectual actor is neither subject to nor legitimised by
her/his gatekeeper function within the evermore mechanised system of calculable
‘knowledge’ inputs and outputs found in the top-down metanarratives of institu-
tional consensus. Rather, through creating and responding to challenging dialogue
that leads to public ‘dissensus’ and puzzlement, the digitized public intellectual
creates ever-widening spheres of dialogue, ushering in a new era of higher
education beyond the prescribed delivery of knowledge. Socrates has thus been
digitally reborn.
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